Russia - Facial Recognition in Moscow

What Happened

The Moscow city government deployed a massive facial recognition system ("Sfera") with over 200,000 cameras to monitor public spaces and the subway system. During the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent political protests, the system was used to track, identify, and arrest political activists, journalists, and citizens violating quarantine or participating in unauthorized gatherings. The database was also leaked on the black market, allowing anyone to buy the tracking history of any citizen for a small fee. Human rights groups criticized the system for violating the right to privacy, freedom of assembly, and creating an absolute surveillance state.

How MEG 1 would have acted

Under MEG 1, the "Sfera" system represents a direct violation of cognitive integrity and public safety. Deploying mass biometric surveillance without individual consent violates the fundamental principle of non-harm and information sovereignty.

MEG 2 Analysis - Legal Framework

Agent level: N3 (individualized/advanced) - mass surveillance and biometric identification system operating in real-time across a metropolitan infrastructure; high individuation and tracking capacity of specific citizens.
Cause (6.1):
(a) system defect - design vulnerability that allowed the leakage and sale of the tracking database on the black market (security defect).
(c) illicit diversion of control (hijacking) - the use of the public security system for political repression and unauthorized personal tracking by actors who bought access on the black market.
Attachment of liability: The public operator (Moscow City Government) is liable for the system defects and the lack of security measures; the unauthorized actors are liable for the illicit tracking.

Procedural Mechanism

6.2 (architectural human confirmation): Biometric identification and tracking of specific citizens in public spaces must require strict, independent judicial confirmation before execution.
7.1 (independent forensics): All access logs to the biometric database must be recorded in an unalterable, independent ledger to prevent insider abuse and unauthorized searches.
9.4 (least privilege): The system's unrestricted access to the real-time biometric data of millions of citizens violates the principle of least necessary access.