Russia - SORM

What Happened

The Russian government deployed an advanced AI-driven mass surveillance and telecommunications interception system called "SORM" (System for Operational-Investigative Activities) across the country, integrating thousands of high-definition cameras with centralized police databases. The system operated in real-time, tracking and identifying citizens in public spaces, and was heavily criticized by civil liberties groups for functioning as a tool of mass surveillance in an authoritarian context, tracking peaceful protesters, journalists, and political opponents without judicial oversight or clear data protection boundaries.

How MEG 1 would have acted

The mass surveillance system failed both the Dynamic Accuracy Index (DAI) and the Index of Safety and Responsibility (ISR) audits due to the lack of transparent legal basis and the high risk of political weaponization, violating public safety and cognitive liberty.

MEG 2 Analysis - Legal Framework

Agent level: N3 (individualized/advanced) - mass surveillance and biometric tracking system; high individuation and tracking capacity of specific citizens.
Cause (6.1):
(a) system defect - design of a biometric tracking system that lacks independent oversight and exhibits potential demographic bias in public spaces (design defect).
(b) autonomous decision error - the system's decision to flag specific citizens based on opaque, algorithmic risk scores.
Attachment of liability: The public operator is fully liable for the privacy violations and the unauthorized tracking; the developers share liability if they built unvalidated models (6.1a).

Procedural Mechanism

6.2 (architectural human confirmation): Biometric identification and tracking of specific citizens in public spaces must require strict, independent judicial confirmation before execution.
7.1 (independent forensics): All access logs to the biometric database must be recorded in an unalterable, independent ledger to prevent insider abuse and unauthorized searches.
9.4 (least privilege): The system's unrestricted access to the real-time biometric data of millions of citizens violates the principle of least necessary access.